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Abstract 
Is it possible to identify new forms of social and political empowerment processes which demonstrates 
innovative ways of coping with social inclusion and fostering solidarity? 
Or is the dominating picture social polarisation, fragmentation, disempowerment and increasing mutual 
mistrust between affluent sections of the population and the marginalised excluded strata? 
Compared to the prototype of industrial society and the golden age of the postwar welfare society todays 
socio-cultural and socio-economic conditions for Politics of Inclusion and Empowerment has changed in 
several ways. 
The shift from government to governance put forward in contemporary political theory (e.g. by March and 
Olsen, 1989) suggests that the creation of multiple actor networks is a key issue in changing the power 
matrix and creating pressure for a new social contract which includes the interests of the excluded groups. 
This involves the creation of new types of government and governance, which can (i) integrate actors 
representing interests at the bottom of the social ladder and (ii) enable the actors to operate across different 
sectoral and spatial levels: the local, regional, national and global levels. As the forces of exclusion in the 
post-industrial era operate on many levels; so the inclusive counter forces must do likewise (Jessop, 1998). 
The radical version of the social exclusion paradigm addresses the problem of a changed power balance 
between actors and suggest to focus on 
(i) the new elite formation at the top of the social ladder 
(ii) The empowerment challenge: how to overcome the fragmentation and weakening of collective actors 
representing the groups at the bottom of the social ladder, and 
(iii) The solidarity challenge: the problem of fostering coalitions between excluded groups and sections of 
working and middle classes. 
The paper discusses what type of institutional reforms and new formations of actors (and coalitions) could 
counteract social exclusion and polarisation in a way, which takes the postindustrial political, economical 
and social conditions into account. Educational citizenship and lifetimepolicy is analyzed as examples of 
positiv sum - orsolidarity reinforcing - solutions in line with emotional, normative and functional needs in the 
age of reflexive modernisation. 
It is argued that today the real missing link in contemporary social scince is the analysis of the growing 
power of elites. Whereas the underclass has been almost overresearched, the analysis of new elite 
formation, collective action, and coalition building by the powerful actors is almost absent. 
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Introduction 
"Social conflicts in the classical industrial society were conflicts over "goods" (income, social 
security etc.). The conflicts in risk society are mainly coriflicts over "bads"". (Beck, 1994:6) . 
Ulrick Beck is, first and foremost, referring to the threats to the environment. The focus of the following is 
the conflicts over the "bads" of the social infrastructure in the phase of reflexive modernity. These are 
captured in the concepts of underclass and social exclusion. Along with the ecological challenge these social 
"bads" form unavoidable points of reference for social sciences dealing with present forms of social 
integration and differentiation. The paper will discuss the theoretical and analytical challenges raised since 
the emergence of social exclusion in the eighties. 
Broadly speaking, social theory and research has produced much excellent criticisms of the New Right's 
agenda and the politics of deregulation and enforcement. But the academic community has been more 
hesitant in analyzing why the politics of deregulation became relatively successful in some countries during 
the eighties, and what type of institutional reforms and new formations of actors (and coalitions) could 
counteract social exclusion in a way, which takes the postindustrial conditions into account. 
The first section briefly summarizes the political and scientific discourse concerning the underclass versus 
the social exclusion discourse, which emerged since the beginning of the eighties in Europe and the United 
States. These two discourses have been influential in the public and political debate, and demonstrate very 
different approaches to what can be addressed as the forces undermining societal harmony and social 
coherence. 
The New Right's version of the underclass defines it as those, who "are poor from their own choice, 
influenced by kin and neighbors like themselves, by wider and corrupting role models, and by welfare 
provision that saps personal discipline" (Westergaard, 1992:576). The social exclusion paradigm addresses 
the "exclusionary society" (Lister, 1990) as the problem. Social exclusion or the "new poverty" is the result 
of socio-economic restructuring and regression in welfare policy. The new social division is not a product 
of cultural changes at the bottom, but a product of changes in the economic and political subsystems and 
action at the top. In the New Right's version the focus is on the problem of the underclass and in the social 
exclusion version the focus is on the problems faced by the underclass. 
The second section sets theunderclass-exclusion debate into a broader historical and theoretical framework 
of writings on social stratification and class theory. The relation between the different paradigms (Marxist, 
Weberian and Functionalist) and the dri ving intellectual and political forces in the development of the 
postwar welfare state are discussed. A paradox of, on the one hand, the rejection of class theory in most 
contemporary dominant social theory and, on the other hand, the emergence of a new "underclass" is 
identified. It is argued that today the real missing link is a more detailed analysis of the growing power of 
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elites. Whereas the underclass has been almost overresearched, the analysis of new elite formation, 
collective action, and coalition building by the powerful actors is almost absent. 
In the third section, the new right underclass and the social exclusion paradigms, and the different policy 
agendas related to the concepts are those of system and social integration (Lockwood, 1965). The 
concepts are reconciliated in the context of the underclass-exclusion discource. 
In the final part the challenges and dilemmas in the development of "politics of postindustrial citizenship" are 
discussed and evaluated in terms of reform agendas. These are at 
(i) the level of system integration e.g.the balance and relation between the political subsystem and the 
economic subsystem and, 
(ii) the level of social integration: e.g. empowerment of actors addressing the problem of social exclusion, 
and 
(iii) the relation between the two: the possible plus sum game of institutional reform and empowerment of 
actors at the bottom. 
To illustrate the dilemmas and potentials of the possible plus sum games linking social and system integration 
and interest of different social formations two particular policy agendas/areas are discussed: educational 
citizenship and "Life Time Politics" in particular sabbatical and parental leave schemes. The latter is not least 
interesting from a gender equality and care perspective, because the innovative aspects of the leave models 
are to fuse otherwise contradictory rationalities: social life quality (due to the temporary access to additional 
time resources for parents) and economic efficiency. 
I. Underclass versus social exclusion 
The term 'social exclusion' is primarily used in the European discourse while the concept of an 'underclass' 
is normally used in the Anglo-Saxon discourse (Larsen & Andersen, 1995 and Jordan, 1996) although 
these concepts are contested in both contexts. The different meanings of the term 'new poverty' thus offer 
a window into these political cultures in general (Silver, 1996: 108). 
In the USA, the New Right viewed the underclass as a result of a new, growing 'culture of dependency' 
(Dean, 199 I), which had eroded the individual's incentives to rational economic and social behavior. It was 
alleged that an 'overgenerous' welfare state had spawned the new underclass characterized by behavioral 
deficiencies . 
In the American public and political debate Ken Auletta's articles in The New Yorker Magazine and his 
book The Underclass (1982) became very influential in promoting the term. He used underclass as a 
shorthand for behavioral and attitudinal problems found among inner-city minorities, although he argued that 
the poor might also be victims of social and economic restructuring. 
Whereas Auletta was ambiguous as to what caused the emergingunderclass, New Right intellectuals took 
over the term underclass and used it to promote a straightforward behavioral or pathological approach, and 
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to attack the efficiency and legitimacy of public welfare programs. The core argument was that the main 
cause of the emergence of an underclass must be attributed to an 'overgenerous ' welfare state that 
encourages and rewards 'dysfunctional' behavior. 
According to Galbraith (1989), the New Right was able to provide a spurious intellectual and moral 
justification forpolicie~ of neglect and enforcement, inspired by an old-fashioned Social Darwinism. The 
condemnation of goverment is part of the continuing design for avoiding responsibility for the poor. 
Charles Murray's book Losing Ground (1984) provided conservatives with the most authoritative argument 
against direct government spending to combat the undeniable growth in poverty. It was used to justify cuts 
in welfare spending and to further marginalise the poor. 
Murray's writings were in line with political scientists and philosophers like Nozick, who developed a more 
sophisticated philosophical justification - often termed 'Anarcho Capitalism' - for reducing the social role 
of government and promoting the 'Minimal State' (Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1981). Murray argued, that social 
policy had created a dependency culture due to 'perverse incentives' which made it profitable for the poor 
to behave in ways in the short term which were destructive in the long term (Murray, 1984:8). 
As Wilson noted (1987) about the 'Murray campaign', it offered to explain not only increasing poverty but 
also increasing rates of joblessness, crime, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare 
dependency, as a result of welfare programs. 
Politics of deregulation and/or politics of enforcement 
By the late 1980s, Katz identified a new shift in the American underclass debate. The response towards 
increasing social disorganization was a 'new authoritarianism ': "that justified big government by advocating 
the e)(tension of its control over the behavior of millions of Americans. By emphasizing the obligations of 
the poor instead of their social rights, the appeal of the new authoritarianism diffused beyond conservative 
circles." (Katz, 1989:1 25-126) 
Lawrence Mead's book Beyond Entitlement: The social obligations of citizenship (1986) represented 
one of the most important steps in the launch of the "politics of enforcement". Mead introduced the notion 
of "active citizenship" and argued that the problems of the underclass should be addressed not by 
e)(panding welfare rights but through a social policy which would enforce work obligations for the claimants 
of social benefits. In this respect Mead differed from those of the New Right who favour a pure 'minimal 
state'. 
Many critics of the term underclass have argued that it is simply the latest 'fashion' (Westergaard, 1992; 
Gans, 1990) for the recurring idea of the undeserving poor and an attemptto blame the victims. Most critics 
of the term underclass suggest that social scientists should avoid using the concept, because it over-
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whelmingly tends to focus on behavioral aspects and has as a more orIess explicit agenda, the intent of 
dividing the poor into deserving and undeserving according to their 'good'or bad'behavior. Nonetheless, 
as some of the critics of the underclass concept point out, it is urgently necessary to address the challenges 
arising from trying to understand the complex interactions between structures, actors and cultures (Mann, 
1994). 
There are many empirical indications that the present forms of social polarization in the transformation 
towards a post-industrial society necessitate creating new approaches and concepts to adequately capture 
the sharpened and multi-dimensional forms of social exclusion. 
The spatial expression of these processes can (in its most evident form) be seen in the creation of new urban 
'ghettos 'in areas which were previously working class areas. In these areas the confluence of 'downward 
socio-economic mobility'for the traditional blue-collar working class -and the lack of effective, coordinated 
policy responses to this trend - set in motion self-reinforcing processes of social and cultural erosion, which 
fuse with economic and labour market marginalisation. This is the empirical basis upon which the underclass 
debate is conducted. 
The two poles in the socio-spatial polarization process are the affluent, white, gated community on the one 
hand and the open, poor and multi cultural ghetto on the other. Segregation implies a radical change in the 
spatial structure of "face-to face" relations. The long-term outcome of such processes undermines the spatial 
conditions for citizenship: the possibility of "face-to-face" interaction with individuals of a different social 
background. 
Whereas the problem of insider-outsider polarization in the labour market has attracted much interest (and 
huge funding), research into the problem of spatial polarization has only marginally been addressed in 
empirical research. This is surprising because much acknowledged theoretical work (in particular by 
Giddens) focused on the role offace-to-face interactions in the constitutions of society (Mortensen, 1995). 
However, as the two American researchers Blakely and Snyder(1998) argue, there are far-reaching 
implications of the middle and upper class "voting with the feet" practice of "spatial closure"; the prototype 
being the gated community (8 million Americans in 1997). The life world of the gated community is one 
where rules and rule following takes place on the basis of self constructed internal (gated) mutual 
understanding and the spatial exclusion of the "outsiders". 
This type of "exclusive localism" undermines the basis for democracy and citizenship because democracy 
is based in part on mutuality and collective citizenship, with the structure of communities tying individuals 
together across their dissimilarities. Or as Blakely and Snyder put it : 
Can there be a social contract without social contact? 
Can a nation survive without inclusive communities to undergrid the practice a/citizenship? (Blakely 
and Snyder, 1998:3) 
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One of the innovative policy responses towards social exclusion has been empowennent oriented action 
programs in deprived neighborhoods. When they work, they empower local actors and transfonn the public 
agencies and the professionals who become transfonned in a more supportive direction and give rise to 
what could be labeled empowering or "inclusive localism". 
But without more far-reaching redistributional changes in the socio economic regime, which can break the 
trend towards "exclusive localism" (in which middle-class households are "voting with the feet" actors) 
inclusive localism is likely to fail. 
Before moving on to the European debate on social exclusion, a few remarks on the concepts and rhetoric 
of workfare and active citizenship are in order, these concepts also had some appeal and mobilized criticism 
in the European debate. 
Remarks on the rhetoric of "active citizenship" and its critics. 
The point to be stressed here is that critics of the New Right should not accept the agenda, where the two 
poles are workfare versuspassive benefits, but redefine the agenda and contrast residual and punitive 
strategies on the one hand and pluralist, redistributive and participative integration strategies on the other. 
The overall question should not be either workfare or passive benefits. Instead, the question on the political 
agenda should be, similar to the Danish and European Community discourse, namely, what type of policy 
needs to be implemented to reflect the interests of the excluded and society as a whole? 
A non- authoritarian notion of participative and empowering integration could be interpreted as extending 
social rights to those on the margins of mainstream society. The importance of acknowledging, for example, 
the right to training and participation in different kinds of integration schemes should therefore not be 
rejected because the notion of 'workfare 'was initially put forward in a particularly minimalist, authoritarian 
and punitive version. 
The focus on the obligations of individuals in the New Right version of citizenship does not necessarily mean 
that all types of obligations should be condemned. The question is how firmly rights and obligations should 
be linked together. Furthennore, obligations in tenns of social responsibility should of course not be 
restricted to individuals at the bottom of the social ladder, but first and foremost include collectivities and 
institutions like private companies. In other words, the rhetoric of rights and obligations should be 
turned on its head and used to argue for mutual social responsibilitylinclusive practice and commitments 
at all levels - in particular the top of the social ladder of the social hierarchy and in all subsystems - not least 
the economic. 
II 
The European social exclusion paradigm. 
With the exception of Britain the tenn underclass has not played a dominant role in the European discourse 
on socio-economic restructuring. (Dahrendorf, 1988: 152). 
Within the rhetoric of the EU institutions and closely linked to the promotion of the "social dimension" the 
concept of social exclusion with its strong intellectual roots in the Durkheimian and French republican 
thought became the key concept. In the French debate on 'L' exclus', the tenn was used as a metaphor for 
the postmodem society's polyphony in which a weakening of common values and the social fabric is 
emerging (Silver, 1994). 
Theoretically, the notion of social exclusion points to a shift in the conceptualization of poverty from extreme 
class inequality and lack of resources in the Townsendian tradition (Andersen et. ai, 1994 )to a broader 
insider-outsider problematique - that is a change offocus in the poverty and inequality discourse from a 
vertical to a horisontal perspective. This shift of focus can to some extent also be described as a shift from 
a Marxist and Weberian tradition of class (and status) analysis to a Durkheimian 'anomie-integration' 
discourse. 
The concept of social exclusion refers both to "processes and consequent situations. More clearly than the 
concept of poverty, understood far too often as referring exclusively to income, it also states out the 
multidimensional nature of the mechanisms whereby individuals and groups are excluded from taking part 
in the social exchanges, from the component practices and rights of social integration and of identity" 
(Commission of the European Community, 1992:8). 
Although there are various degrees of exclusion from full social and political citizenship 'the boundaries that 
separate the 'socially excluded' (the underclass) must be conceptualised as relatively complete and 
multidimensional' (Heisler, 199 I :475). Heisler argues that, since the socially excluded lack any meaningful 
market position, it is best conceptualised as a social category, not aclass. The socially excluded is to be 
located outside the class structure. 
However, such types of statement are a matter of dispute. Many studies show that the long-term 
unemployed and other socially excluded individuals, continue to orient themselves towards and hold 
'mainstream' nonns and values. However it seems unlikely that these norms and values can be maintained 
over a long-tenn process of social exclusion and the emerging spatial segregation and polarisation in West-
European societies. Separate nonns might actually be developing practices and ideologies according to the 
settings in which these segregated parts of the populations live (Jordan, 1996). This might, in the words of 
Delors (1993), threaten the social cohesion of society leaving the European Welfare Models with an 
uncertain future. 
"Underclass" has recently been used in countries like Gennany, Holland, Austria (Mann, 1994), Denmark 
(Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen, 1994). Contrary to the American and British debate on the underclass, 
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it does not usually refer to behavioral deficiencies', but primarily to the lack of economic and social 
opportunities due to economic restructuring and social change. 
In a keynote speech at the 1994 World Congress of Sociology Wilson maintained, that it is unlikely that, for 
example, Britain and France will experience the same type of concentrated urban poverty as the United States. 
However, Wilson argued that aconvergence between the United States and Europe might be occurring due 
to socio-economic restructuring and a change in political attitudes (Wilson, 1994:63). 
As Silver (1996) notes the multidimensional notion of exclusion is very plastic and is used as a metaphor 
for the post-industrial society's social polyphony. As a scientific concept aiming at grasping a new form of 
social fracture linked to the weakening of common values and the appearance of signs of a threatening 
breakdown of the social fabric - not least described by Pierre Bourdieu and his colleagues (Bourdieu et al. 
1993) - exclusion was in particular launched in 1991 by Touraine in his now famous article "Face 11 
l'exclusion" (Touraine 1991). 
The concept of exclusion has been criticised by many French social scientist (e.g. Bertho 1997; Castel 
1991, 1995a, 1995b). They do not recognise exclusion as a scientific concept, although acknowledging its 
metaphoric qualities. With the concept of 'des affiliation ' Castel has tried to conceptualise what is at stake 
inthe notion of exclusion. Desaffilation thus concerns with the multiple, dynamic changes the social bond is 
undergoing in post-industrial society, especially after the reappearance of mass unemployment in the 
mid 1970s. As wage labour is weakened as society's great mechanism of integration social justice can no 
longer be a question of insurance against foreseeable risks affecting wage labour. Thus, citizenship has 
become a question of the active "production of society", as opposed to merely a question of rights (Donzelot 
& Estebe 1994). This leads to the concept of the 'enabling welfare state', or the 'animating state' 
(Donzelot& Estebe, 1994 and Visti-Hansen, 1995). 
Partnership and social cooperatives, social economy initiatives, cross-sectional action programmes are, 
together with the rise of new empowering and entrepreneurial roles of professionals and NOOs in the field 
of social and community work, some of the renewals created by these new policies . Mediation and 
mobilisation in a landscape with a range of actors (e.g. housing associations and public welfare agencies) 
creates dilemmas and new challenges for social work 
To conclude, the common feature of the 1980s and 1990s underclass and social exclusion discourse is that 
the focus has changed in the direction of an inclusion-exclusion problematique. 
In the next section I will argue that the contemporary stratification order of the postfordist societies is not 
only one of horizontal stratification, inside or outside the labour market/mainstream society, but also one 
of vertical stratification. This arises from differences in access to and command over economic, cultural, 
social and symbolic capital. As Levitas (1996) notes, the exclusion-integration discourse can obscure the 
fact that the positions into which people are "integrated" through paid work are often fundamentally unequal. 
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II. From social class eto social exclusion 
The theoretical debates concerning the changes in the forms of social stratification that have taken place in 
the transformation from the advanced industrial society to the post-industrial society of the 1980s and 1990s 
will serve as a point of departure from which we can get a closer grip on the new features of the exclusion-
integration discourse. It will also enable us to interpret the discourse from within the theoretical framework 
associated with the two concepts of system and social integration. 
Across the different theoretical approaches one can talk about a change of focus from a class and 
inequality problematique to an integration-disintegration problematique. This is a change in the way of 
thematizing the problems of social and system integration (Lockwood, 1964) from a position that perceives 
social divisions in a vertical perspective, to one that reflects them in a horizontal perspective. 
Three positions dominated the social scientific debate on social stratification, class and inequality up un til 
the 1980s: the Functionalist, the Weberian and the Marxist tradition. Despite their differing views about the 
constitution of class and stratification patterns in advanced industrial societies - they all dealt with relations 
of class or stratification from the up-down or vertical perspective. Let us briefly review the three traditions. 
Functionalist tradition 
The functionalist position argues that in every dynamic and developed society it is necessary to link the 
unequal distribution of goods and symbolic rewards to the different positions in the social distribution of 
work to ensure the optimal use of talents (Davis & Moore, 1945). The fundamental thesis of functionalist 
and Parsonian inspired sociology, however, was that the advanced industrial societies moved towards the 
ideal of 'the open society' - a society which still displayed inequalities between positions, but where 'fair 
competition' increasingly gave individuals equal chances of reaching various positions within the hierarchy. 
Ascriptive attributes such as ethnicity and sex and an individual's social background would be of less 
importance compared with the patterns of social mobility of early capitalism. Early capitalism was strongly 
colored by ascriptive processes at the group and individual level, and was, at the structural level , 
characterised by strong closure mechanism' - in particular unequal access to property and political power 
for the bottom strata. 
The dominant thesis in mainstream sociology was that modem industrial society was reaching a situation 
where stratification mechanisms were exclusively determined by individuals' different abilities and 
achievements. Thus meritocratic selection became the dominant mechanism and principle of social 
stratification in the advanced industrial societies. 
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In Lockwood's tenninology (Lockwood, 1964), the relationship between system integration and social 
integration was seen as principally unproblematic. System integration here means the harmonic relationship 
between the dominant institutions or parts in society, in particular the relationship between the economic and 
political system. Social integration means the relationship between actors - in short: the actors' acceptance 
of the rules of the game in the distribution of life chances. 
The meritocratic society thus reproduced a 'norm of social justice ' ; an open opportunity structure and 
distribution of social rewards according to ability and achievement. Thus, the need for powerful collective 
actors such as the working class with its antagonistic interests in relation to the social order (the Marxist 
view) would be undermined, or at least reduced. 
The systemic and social rationality of the open societies were such that individuals to a much greater extent 
than previously could take part in open and fair competition for positions in the pattern of social 
stratification. The reward logic of the modem, meritocratic achievement -oriented society thus had both a 
societal rationality of dynamism and growth, a system integrative rationality, and a rationality of social 
integration. 
The optimistic scenario for the advanced industrial societies was thus that meritocratic selection would 
ensure both system and social integration. Firstly, because human resources would be mobilised and used 
efficiently from a societal point of view due to the structures of incentives and rewards. Secondly, because 
individuals had a widened space in which to act in order to achieve his or her own goals. 
Inequalities in terms of outcome (both symbolic and material rewards) between the different positions in the 
hierarchy of strata would be interpreted as legitimate by the individual actors. This would be due to the 
decreasing importance of traditional stratification mechanisms and the development of the modem industrial 
societies' dynamic potential of growth which would guarantee both a general increase in living standards 
and increasing upward social mobility. 
The vision of the open society was not only an American phenomenon, nor was it exclusively linked to the 
political right. In the European political discourse this optimistic diagnosis was to a large extent shared by 
many social democrats, intellectuals and administrators and other actors involved in the golden period of 
the welfare state after the Second World War. In many areas of postwar welfare policies - such as policies 
to promote more equal access to the educational system - social democratic and other leftist forces argued 
(and in Scandinavia and other countries successfully so) that the rationality of such reforms was not only 
moral and political (a more egalitarian society) but also functional in terms of economic growth. The 
sufficient mobilisation of the 'unused talents' of the lower strata/classes would increase economic dynamism 
and social innovation (an understanding also put forward in theories of human capital). 
Rigid stratification systems, it was argued, are not only unjust but also dysfunctional because they tend to 
reduce the survival value of a society by minimising the efficiency of discovery, recruitment and training of 
human resources. 
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In post war American sociology this type of argument was summarised by Tumin (1953) is his classic 
criticism of Davis and Moore (1945). He emphasized the dysfunctions of social stratification. Stratification 
regimes should be evaluated according to their ability to ensure social integration at the bottom of the social 
ladder. If unequal rewards are not seen as legitimate by actors at the bottom and the middle ofthe hierarchy 
the response is lack of motivation and a higher level of transaction costs in society. He also argued that 
differential rewards to different groups could only be justified as functional for society's efficiency if equal 
access to recruitment and training for all talented persons existed. 
These arguments were very similar to those put forward by the various academic actors who promoted the 
institutional redistributive or social democratic type of welfare state in postwar Europe (eg. Titmuss, 
I 974).But unlike many of their American colleagues they were convinced that social citizenship was the 
most important "social cement" of the post war welfare society. 
Weberian and Marxist critiques 
Critics of mainstream functionalism, primarily from the Weberian and Marxist inspired camps, emphasized 
those elements of the functionalist tradition which could be understood as a universallegitimisation of 
inequality. Davis and Moore's argument was that in all societies it is functionally necessary to link unequal 
rewards to the positions of the stratification order, as some positions are of more functional importance than 
others, and because there will always be a limited amount of talent available. The positions that require the 
most talent and qualifications therefore had to receive the highest rewards to ensure that the best qualified 
candidates/individuals would possesslhold those positions. This basic argument was rejected as an unhistoric 
legitimisation of 'natural inequality' - not only in pre-industrial societies but in the advanced industrial 
societies as well. 
Weberians maintained the relevance of the concept of power which could explain why some groups could 
ensure symbolic and material goods at the expense of others. This could be achieved e.g. through 
mechanisms of social closure (Weber, 1968). Marxists maintained that the institution of property and the 
exploitation via production was crucial in generating systematic inequalities and class divisions. 
Others, such as Dahrendorf (1959), suggested at the end of the 1950s that the concept of authority was 
central for an explanation of the new forms of social stratification which could be observed in advanced 
industrial societies. Many social scientists, like the early Giddens (1973), wanted to combine and synthesize 
Weberian and Marxist approaches. 
On the empirical level both Marxists and Weberians rejected the thesis of 'the open society'. The rejection 
has taken many forms, from C. Wright Mill's (1956) studies of the power elite to the Weberians' 
emphasizing the emerging types of closure mechanisms in the modern professional complex (Parkin, 1979), 
to neo-marxists like Bravermann who made an attempt to update Marx ' s anal ysis of the degradation of 
work (Bravermann, 1974). Another attempt would be Wright's project, started in the 1970's, to introduce 
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the importance of the possession of knowledge or organisation based resources in a revised Marxist scheme 
(Wright, 1979; 1985; 1997). 
The postwar scholars inspired by Marx and Weber observed, like the functionalists and logic of 
industrialism theories (Keer et. al, 1960), an increasing differentiation in the forms of social division of work 
- in particular the rise oftbe "new middleclass(es)" and the modem professional complex. However, for 
them the changes of the technicaVhorisontal division of work did not imply that the vertical division in classes 
disappeared - just that it adopted new forms. 
The present 'death of class' approach 
Since the I 980s there has been a revitalized and intense debate about the declining significance of social 
class. On the one hand it is maintained that social class still plays a major role in the stratification order of 
the capitalist system (Westergaard, 1995; Wright, 1997). Although other social cleavages such as gender 
and ethnicity interfer with or in some cases are even more crucial for social divisions than class (Crompton, 
1993). On the other hand "culturalist" approaches suggest that the social classes are dead and the 
contemporary stratification order is primarily based on cultural phenomena and subscription to life styles 
(pahl, 1989; Clark and Lipset, 1991; Pakulski and Waters, 1996). 
Pakulski and Waters (1996) suggest that the contemporary stratification order is one of non-egalitarian c1asslessness. The 
transfonmtion oflb!SIIlllificatioo ocd:!r is p!rt of a wide-ranging societal transformation conceprua!ised as: risk society,~­
FrnIism, ~-tralitionaliza ~ refeningon trese topics to autIus like Bell, Beck, Gic:tiens, L)OIllId, Lash 
and Urry, Offe, Featherstone and Robertson). 
Pakulski and Waters suggest that the stratification order of capitalist societies can be traced in terms of three 
successive periods: 
I . Economic class-society in the nineteenth century characterized by a dominating and a dominated class 
and struggle between interests groups that emerge from the economic realm. The axial principles of 
society, politics and economy are : laissez-faire state, plutocratic and revolutionary parties and owner 
capitalism. 
2. Organized-class society in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century characterized by a society 
dominated by a political sphere. Important axial principles are corporatism, mass parties and Fordism. 
3. Status-conventional society in the contemporary period (approx. since the 1980s) characterized by a 
stratification regime which emerges from the cultural sphere. Important axial principles are globalisation, 
niche parties and post Fordism. 
The occupational categories (which are crucial in traditional class-analysis) can still playa critical role "but 
only because it is a badge of status, an indicator of one's importance and of one's capacity to consume'" 
(Pakulski and Waters, 1996: 157). 
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Pakulski and Waters summarizes four basic propositions in traditional class theory: 
I . Economism: property and markets are held to be fundamental organizing principles in society. The 
structure of production determines a structure of positions: classes/employment categories. 
2 . Groupness: the classes develops distinct cultural communities. Class membership affects identity, 
culture and lifestyle. 
3. Behavioral and cultural linkage specify that the class based cultural communities are the enduring bases 
for political action and distributional conflict. 
4 . Transformational capacity: classes are collective actors that can make history and transform the 
structure of production. 
The status-conventional theory suggested by Pakulski and Waters offers the following alternative 
propositions: 
I. Culturalism: the stratification order is based on subscription to lifestyles formed around consumption 
patterns, information flows, cognitive agreements, aesthetic preferences and value commitments. 
Symbolic dimensions (including socioecOliomic status but in a symbolized form) provide focuses for 
identification and will compete with each other in the field of social structure, and this produces multiple 
status cleavages. 
2 . Fragmentation ensures that the multiple status cleavages functions as a "status bazaar" for individuals. 
Therefore conventional society is a fluid matrix of fragile formations, where identity is constructed in 
a process of reflexive individualism. Membership of one status group does not necessarily contradict 
membership of any of the other groups. Closure, however, remains effective in status-conventional 
society; that is 'freedoms in most cases are relevant to exit from status groups rather than entry' 
(Pakulski and Waters, 1996:158). 
3. Autonomization: Culture and behavior is to a large extent decoupled from stratificationallocation. 
Profligacy becomes the new label for individual behavior. Political preferences, educational 
opportunity, patterns of marriage and income are "self-referential rather than externally constrained" 
(Pakulski and Waters, 1996: ISS). 
4 . Resignification: In pursuit of symbolic attachments the actors will constantly reorder and redefine the 
symbolic dimensions (including traditional status-membership dimensions like education and ethnicity) 
into a more ephemeral regime. 
The position outlined here can be interpreted as postmodern version of statements put forward in the 
functionalist tradition of the 50' s. For example Nisbet claimed that class divisions were replaced by status 
inequalities (Nisbet, 1959). Kerret.al, (1960) expressed the vision of pluralistic industrialism in their 
classical analysis in "Industrialism and Industrial Man": 
"The industrial society is an open community encouraging occupational and geographic mobility and 
social mobility. Industrialisation calls for flexibility and cOmpetition: it is against tradition and 
status based upon family, class, religion, race or caste." (Kerr, et.al 1960. Quoted in Grusky, 
1994:664) 
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From Bottom-up to Top-down "class" struggle? 
Pakulski and Waters mention that closure and conflict still exist and stress that they do not argue that a 
decline in inequality in contemporary society has taken place. However, the difficulty with their theoretical 
framework, seen from the point of view of the underclass problematique, is that it does not really leave 
space for the existence o~ collective actors! strategic interest groups at the middle and top playing games. 
This can create increased "external constraints", and be successful in extemalising social costs to those at 
the bottom. 
Are the propositions of culturalism, fragmentation, autonomization and resignification fruitful tools for 
understanding and grasping the nature ofThatcherism and Reaganomics - the most radical political projects 
in the West after the second world war? In fact the regime changes in the era of Reaganomics and 
Thatcherismcould first and foremost be interpreted as a revitalised project of a strategic interest group-
a block of collective actors - who demonstrated a "transformational capacity" with a clear strategic direction 
for intended social change. In short a change from market economy to market society. 
The postmodem emphasis on particularism, diversity, choice can according to Taylor-Gooby become a 
"smokescreen" behind intended projects towards extended inequality and a residualized system of welfare 
provision, thus ignoring the significance of market liberalism and the associated trends to extended inequality 
and lack of opportunity structures and real possibilities of choice at the bottom of the socialladder(Taylor 
Gooby, 1994:385) 
Approaches like that of Palkulski and Waters, which have become very influential in contemporary 
sociology do touch upon real issues, e.g. in the younger generation, where "culturalist approaches" might 
explain new types of mixed idendities and so forth. But the approach is inadequate for explaining the nature 
of actions and strategic interest at the top of the social ladder. Today the direction of postrnodem offensive 
"class struggle" is mainly from top to bottom, whereas the "class struggle" from the bottom to the top is 
mainly defensive. 
Seen from the social exclusion angle it is not sufficient when Pakulski and Waters suggest that " .. the 
stratificational categories of status-conventional society constitute a complex mosaic of taste subcultures, 
"new associations", civic initiatives, ethnic and religious revolutionary groups, generational cohorts, 
community action groups, new social movements, gangs, alternative lifestyle colonies, alternative production 
organisations, educational alumni, racial brotherhoods, gender sisterhoods, tax rebels, fundamentalist and 
revivalist religious movements, internet discussion groups, purchasing co-ops, professional associations. 
Many are ephemeral, some are continuos and stable." (Pakulski and Waters, 1996: 157) 
Even if one to some extent accepts the postmodem point of departure - that the generati ve phenomena in 
the present stratification order are competing "symbolic dimensions" which produces multiple status 
cleavages - the problem is that the notion of power relations and criteria for analysing what is stable and 
what is fluid are very vague. The notion of social hierarchies (Mouzelis, 199 I) which is discussed in term 
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of closure is not developed further. But this might be a road to a productive dialogue between the 
"culturalist" framework suggested by Pakulski and Waters and the marx ian and weberian legacy. 
Following Westergaard 'class-denying'theory commits two errors: it blurs the distinction between class-in 
itself (issues of economic category) andclass-for-itself (political group-formation) and to infer, from new 
complexities of political group formation, an erosion of economic-<:ategorical class which is contrary to the 
fact (Westergaard, 1996: 142). 
To sum up I suggest three hypothesis about the nature of the contemporary stratification order of post-
industrial capitalist societies in which the social exclusion problem should be understood. These tendencies 
have so far especially been relevant with reference to United Kingdom and America where I abour markets 
have been deregulated and the welfare states have been under severe pressure during the 1980s and I 990s: 
I . It is possible to identify formation of elites - or "strategic interest groups" at the top of the social ladder. 
They are numerically speaking relatively marginal, but nevertheless powerful in terms of economic, 
cultural, political and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1987). The strategic interest groups donot form a 
homogenous mass, but they are conscious about their structural position and they act in accordance 
with their interests - in many ways as a collective force - although, as Bourdieu makes clear, these 
'interests' in the form of 'symbolic power' are 'shielding, and thereby strengthening relations of 
dominance by hiding them under the cloak of nature, benevolence and meritocracy (Wasquant, 
1993:1-2). 
As Crompton (1993) and Westergaard (1 996:chapter 8,) argues the concentration of power among ruling 
elite networks is in itself enough to maintain that the contemporary capitalist stratification system is still asort 
of class society. 
2. The working class( es) and the middle class( es) still exist but the boundaries between the two have 
been blurred - not only in the sphere of consumption but also on the labour market - not least amongst 
the younger generations. Even Wright admits that 'class may not be the most powerful orfundarnental 
cause of societal organization and class struggle may not be the most powerful transforrnative force 
in the world today' (Wright, 1996:711). In most cases social differentiation is based both on class 
divisions (position in the economic system) and other social divisions including status cleavages arising 
from the consumption and cultural field. 
3. The real paradox is that the same tendencies which seem to have made traditional classes redundant 
according to the 'death of class' thesis have at the same time, primarily in America and the United 
Kingdom, created a new "class" - the so-called underclass. 
For Pakulski and Waters the 'underclass' is defined by 'the symbolization's attached to post-colonial 
migration, race, ethnicity, gender, age and pattern of family SUPP?rt, (Pakulski and Waters, 1996: 157-5 8) 
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What Pakulski and Waters do not take into account is that the discursive agency and power in the process 
of defining and promoting the symbolization's of the underclass was linked to a game (collective action) 
aimed at strategic change of the rules of social citizenship (which in tum had been created through former 
collective actions and negotiations). In short, the notion of the underclass in the New Right version was part 
of a top-down economic and symbolic "class struggle." By reinforcing "an entire discursive network of 
associations between delinquency and dependency, between crime and poverty, between race and 
antisocial behaviour, between immorality and single parenthood, and so forth" (Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 
1992:44) the concept of an 'underclass' was used as a means to keep the middlemasses 'integrated' (by their 
fear oflosing out) and to justify a new 'class division', hostility and closure mechanisms between the 
integrated middle masses and the excluded 'underclass'. 
In other words the promotion of the new right notion of the underclass was part of a particular type of 
collective action - using the tactics of power which were already observed by Weber: 
"Usually one group of competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another group of 
(actual or potential) competitors - race, language, religion, local or social origin, descent, resident, etc. - as 
a pretext for attempting their exclusion." (Weber, 1968:242) 
In the following section I will connect the underclass and social exclusions paradigms (and the types of 
actions, narratives, rhetoric and institutional/regime changes linked to them) to the concepts and theoretical 
framework of social and system integration. 
III. Social and system integration in the New Right version. 
At the level of system integration the New Right argues that the subsystems of the market economy and 
the welfare state became increasingly incompatible. An idea that was not new, but had been promoted by 
neoclassical economists and public choice theorists in many variants for decades. So far it was old beer in 
new bottles. 
What was new - and maybe one of the reasons why Murray and others for a while became relative 
successful in the public and political discourse through out the eighties- was that the old incompatibility 
thesis of social citizenship and efficient market economy was linked to an explanation of (although as shown 
biased and moralising) a number of changes at the level of social integration; namely crime, deviance, long 
term dependency, changing gender and family relations . 
The "New Rightlneoliberal trick" was to link the macro( economic) and micro(moral) level of analysis and 
explain the observations at the micro level as rational choices of the poor caused by the "negative" moral 
and economic incentives offered by welfare state institutions (the negative moral incentives being the benefits 
to unmarried mothers). 
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The welfare state had increasingly made it rational and legitimate to break basic "rules" of good behaviour 
according to the standards set by the New Right (the commitment to values of the self-supporting household 
etc.).The "behavioral deficiences"- which was what defined the underclass and distinguished them from the 
"deserving poor", was a symptom of a crises at the level of actors where a vicious circle in which a culture 
of "rule breaking"(alias dependency culture) was developed. 
Following this diagnosis the suggested solution was the politics of deregulation, which was supposed to 
(re )create the positive incentives for market integration at the bottom of the social ladder. The politics of 
deregulation would solve the functional contradictory relationship between the market and the welfare state 
(in other words addressthe problem of system (dis)integration) . 
Again the trick was to argue that such changes (politics of deregulation) at the level of system integration 
would create the necessary "positive incentives". This would solve the problems at the level of social 
integration: Increasing market integration at the bottom of the social latter would in tum restore classical 
values of the work ethic. In a wider sense it would restore the values of merit ocr at ism: the direct link 
between achievement and reward, which earlier in history was the ruling and successful principle for 
American society. The politics of deregulation would therefore encourage rule following unlike the politics 
of social citizenship which according to Murray encouraged rule breaking. 
A third New Rightlneoliberal trick, which was successfully (and still is) picked up in the political discourse 
by right wing populists is to legitimate what - seen from asocial exclusion angle was collective action against 
the poor - as an extension of individual, democratic rights: the rhetoric of "voting with the feet" developed 
in the public choice tradition. 
The middle and upper class legal, rule following actions of maneuvers of tax reduction, forming gated 
communities etc. was justified in this way. Actions of excluded groups e.g. individuals working in the black 
economy in order to keep their household over the poverty line could be considers as "illegal", rule 
breaking action. 
The "Murray narrative" was successful in linking macro "issues" to everyday/micro (middle- and upper-
class) "troubles" (turning C. Wright-Mills notion of good sociology on its head). As all good narratives it 
offered a explanation of former success (the meritocratic value system), present problems (dependency 
culture) and future solutions (deregulation). 
Incentives for individuals and for collective actors. 
It follows from the above that the linkage between system ilJ>tegration and social integration is the notion of 
purely individual incentives - since the only recognised collectivity in the Murrayan framework is "the 
underclass". "Bad" incentives create behavioral deficiences at the bottom and stimulate rule breaking with 
regard to a sound workethic, rewards based on achievement and family orientation."Good" incentives make 
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possible the plus sum game of economic efficiency and responsible, self-supporting citizens in stable family 
relationships. 
However,just as the notion of rights and obligations can be turned on its head the same applies to the notion 
of incenti ves (as discussed in section m.If incenti ves are applied to collective actors and they include 
incentives to manage aud negotiate social costs and enhance inclusion for those at the bottom, the 
conclusions with regard to adequate incentive structures become radically different (2). 
The New Right package of arguments was able to gain support because it touched upon real issues 
(cf.Mann) and had some- although highly superficial- analytical power by linking concerns at the level of 
system integration and concerns at the level of social integration. The narrative was put forward in such a 
way that it appealed to narrow interests and concerns of the middle class and partly affluent sections of the 
working class. It was in line with present right-wing populism. 
As both Katz and Mead observed the politics of deregulation was not very successful in tennns of moral and 
economic reintegration of the underdass( but definitely in terms of increased rewards for the top). This 
explains why the politics of enforcement became more and more dominant. 
As Jordan argues the consequence of a decade of economic individualism, was increasing polarization which 
increased the transaction costs of all exchanges and hence reduced efficiency. According to Jordan( 1996) 
this process may have reached a point where it began to threaten system integration: 
"" Nations such as the US and the UK, which have radically modified their old institutions without 
solving underlying issues of polarization, conflict and the power of distributional coalitions, may be 
even further weakened, and experience accelerated relative economic decline, as social costs 
escalate. This institutional means for dealing with issues of poverty and social exclusion could 
become very important determinants of the relative success of national economies in the next 
century" (Jordan, 1996: 227) 
Following Jordan the dynamics of neoliberal politics produced rational egoists who are designed to be good 
at self-interested strategies (Jordan, 1996:212). The politics of deregulation ignored perverse incentives and 
moral hazard of a collective kind for example "the discrepancy between the payojft for broad, 
inclusive communal solidarity on the one hand and narrow, snobbish, exclusive mutuality on the 
other: or between unskilledformal employment and trade union membership and irregular, informal 
economic activity and membership ofa semi-criminal network" , (Jordan, 1996:211). 
Jordan optimistically concludes that once the increased transactions costs at all levels in society become 
visible, some of the actors in the coalition supporting the politics of deregulation will be open to changing 
their attitudes. This will be from policy of enforcement to an emphasis on educative and supportive 
initiatives. 
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IV. Social and system integration and the social exclusion paradigm. 
The competing diagnoses of the problem within the social exclusion paradigm can briefly be interpreted as 
follows: 
At the level of system integration the paradigm suggests that a combination of processes of global socio-
economic restructuring undermined the conditions for the postwar welfare states in which social citizenship 
was expanded. The strategic direction was that the economy became disembedded from society. This 
is to some extent similar to transition from traditional society to the "pure market society" (Olofsson, I 995) 
Drawing on aJessop's regulation theoretical approach the "hollowing out" of the nation states decreased 
the room for maneuver for traditional Keynesian politics. This situation which emerged from the mid to late 
seventies could be interpreted as a new type of crises at the level of system integration. The balance 
between two subsystems: the globalised economy and the national political subsystem, changed in favour 
of the first, leaving the social democratic forces and their supporters in a state of confusion. The prototype 
ofthis trend in Europe was the collapse of the Labour government in the United Kingdom (1979), the 
Socialist-Communist government in France( I 983),the social democratic governments of Denmark (1982), 
and Sweden (1991). 
In the period of turbulence the pressure from neoliberal and New Right populist forces increased the strong 
postwar alliance between the working class and important sections of the middle classes lost terrain and to 
various degrees failed to cope with the new challenges. The power matrix changed in a way, which for a 
time created possibilities for new actors who, to various degrees rejected the major path of post war socio-
economic development in which negotiated compromises between labour, capital and the state was 
institutionalised in a corporatist type of governance. 
The strategies, or to be more modest, the dilemmas and challenges, which must be addressed according 
to the social exclusion paradigm are by nature quite complex. As I will argue latter the complicated task of 
identifying possible "solutions" of the social exclusion problem to some extent requires a rethinking of the 
(although still very useful heuristic) concepts of system and social integration and the relation between them. 
I will try to outline some of the issues at stake drawing on insights from political economy and political 
theory. 
From the social exclusion angle the implications of the shift from "government to governance" put forward 
in contemporary political theory (e. g. March and Olsen, 1989) suggests that the creation of multiple 
actornetworks is a key issue in order to change the power matrix and create pressure for a new social 
contract taking interest of excluded groups more into account. This involves the creation of new types of 
governance, which can 
(1) integrate actors representing interest at the bottom of the social ladder and 
(2) enable the actors to operate across different spatial levels: the local, regional, national and global. 
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The latter task is necessary because the forces of exclusion in the postfordist era operates in complex ways 
and on many levels. Therefore the inclusive counter forces can neither operate exclusi vely local, regional 
or nationaL 
At the level of social integration the social exclusion paradigm in particular addresses the problem of a 
changed power balance between actors: 
(i) the problem of new elite formation at the top of the social ladder 
(ii) the fragmentation and weakening of power of collective actors representing and articulating the interest 
of the loosers at the bottom of the social ladder. 
(iii) the problem of fostering coalitions between excluded groups and sections of working and middle 
classes 
These were the issues discussed in section 2 as they were in different ways reflected in the criticism of "class 
denying" theory. 
The backlash for trade unionism (with the Scandinavian trade union movement as an interesting exception 
from the general pattern) and the lack of efficient collective action (empowerment) of the new loosers of 
excluded groups constitutes an important part of the problem at the level of social integration. 
In the debate over new action and policy agendas addressing the disempowerment of the losers the broader 
concept of empowerment (despite the origins of the concept in third world action research) of (potential) 
losers has gained new terrain. (Friedmann, 1995). In short empowerment is a process of "awareness and 
capacity building leading to greater participation, to greater decision-making power and control, and to 
transforrnative action (Karl, 1995:14). 
Taking the more diverse and complicated socio-economic and political-cultural picture into account 
compared with the traditional industrial society), it is obvious that the politics of empowerment and inclusion 
must 
(i) be able to take "particularities" into account (cross class, cross gender, cross ethnicity just to mention 
a few) and 
(ii) cope with the difficult task oftransfonning these "particularities" into stable - but flexible coalitions 
which can operate at the different levels. 
This is what was briefly discussed before as taking the shift from (national) government to multi- scaled 
governance into account. 
It follows from the above that at the level of social integration, the challenge to identify potentials for 
remobilisation of "old" actors (the still existing although diminished working class) and empowerment of new 
actors representing excluded groups (3). 
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Generallyspeaking this could be supportedatthe level of system integration byanew balanceofuniversalist 
social citizenship rights and politics of "positive selectivism", which will be discussed further in 
section 6. 
But before doing that the implications and ideas arising from the discussion will be used to reconcile the 
concepts of social and system integration as they have been put forward by Lockwood(l964) . 
V. Reconciliation of the system and social integration concepts. 
The social integration and system integration concepts were developed in the phase of advanced 
industrialism, with strong national states and few well organised collective actors. Today both the role of 
the nation state as the locus of the political and the pattern of action arising from distinct social formations 
have to some extent changed. However this does not mean that social hierarchies have disappeared. On 
the contrary the actors at the top of the social ladder have increased their power resources. This process 
took place at the same time as the postmodem and neoliberal rhetoric of individualism, decentralisation, 
choice, diversity and so forth emerged. 
Within mainstream sociology e.g. the Parsonian tradition, the concept of social integration invites to view 
conflicts between collective actors as something which should be avoided. The social exclusion case 
suggests that in the age of flexible capitalism (Sennett, 1998) lack of collective action from the bottom is 
the problem! 
Generally speaking it could be argued that the ability to organize collective action from the bottom, and 
therefore to some extent the presence of organised conflictual relationship between the affluent and the less 
affluent in the game over access and control over valued goods in society, is a condition for reaching 
sustainable, negotiated social contracts in society. In the present period of transition broadly speaking from 
fordism to postfordism this it not (yet) the case. 
I suggest that the notion of social integration should be developed to include the distinction between 
exclusionary "socially unproductive" versus inclusive "socially productive" types of conflicts. The argument 
is inspired by the classical american study of the positive functions of social conflict by Lewis Coser (1956). 
A socially unproductive type of conflictual relationship tends to produce self-reinforcing paths of zero 
or min us sum games. The intended or unintended social costs of collective action at the top or middle of 
the social ladder are extemalised to the bottom of the social hierarchy. This is set in motion through "voting 
with feet" and/or the "politics of enforcement" types of dynamics, which increase social polarization (i.e. 
increased economic inequality, socio-spatial segregation etc.). The conflictual relationships and mutual 
distrust between actors increases the transactions costs, which Oll a long term basis can cause crises at the 
level of system integration. 
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The socially productive, transformative type of conflictual relationship can be defined as types of 
conflicts between actors allowing for plus sum games and, depending on the type of society in question, 
eventually to a transformation of the social order (4). These games increase positi ve incenti ves, mutual 
understanding and social learning of collective and individual actors and can thereby support the ongoing 
dynamics of collective citizenship, reduce transactions costs and enhance social capital; the ability to 
inclusi ve coorperation"socio-economic innovation etc. 
VI. Options for the politics of postindustrial citizenship 
Earlier the American underclass debate was contrasted with the European social exclusion debate. To a 
large extent this reflected different political cultures and regulatory regimes in which the role of social 
citizenship in the overall regime differed. 
New plus sum games with regard to collective action and institutional reform are more likely in the 
Scandinavian type of universalist welfare regimes. In the former substantial sections of the middle classes 
to a much larger extent than in residual regimes such as the US have experienced in their daily life and 
become socialized to see public goods and citizenship (in particular in policy areas s health and education) 
as a condition for their own life strategies. 
In residual welfare regimes, the obstacles for gaining support for neo solidaristic types of regime changes 
and the creation of stable cross class, cross generational, cross ethnicity and cross gender innovative 
redistribution coalitions of public goods, income and time resources are much larger. 
In the foil owing discussion of obstacles and potentials for postindustrial citizenship the reference point will 
mainly be Scandinavia and Europe, but some of the issues will be of relevance for the USA as well. 
The return of social democratic and center forces in governments in countries like France, Denmark, and 
the UK have rejected the neoliberal path of the eighties in some ways. In areas like education/human capital 
investments they have for a long time argued in favor of a "Schumpeterian" type of growth politics including 
an offensive human capital investment strategy (5) 
This type of policy has a broad cross class political appeal, and economical rationality. It responds to the 
challenge of globalisation and the ongoing formation of the information or knowledge society in which human 
capital investments become even more important than in the age of fordism. 
In the knowledge or information society "educational citizenship" is definitely important in shaping future 
patterns of social stratification(Esping-Andersen, 1995). From asocial polarisation angle the question is 
whether an "elitistlmeritocratic" or an inclusive/egalitarian version of "Schumpeterianism" will win? 
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On the demand side the crucial question is to what extent increased human capital investment will 
be linked to educational citizenship. For example, combining improved quality of the educational 
institutions and programs of positive selectivism ("affirmative action" in the American context) for 
educationally disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, manual redundant workers or ethnic 
minorities, or additional resources to schools in deprived neighborhoods. If this is not the case, it may 
well will be implemented in such a way that meritocratic mechanisms of exclusion in the educational 
system will be reinforced. 
On the supply side of the economy the question is whether an expanded social economy grounded 
in local social movements and concerned to empower the poor and underprivileged could provide 
more effective solutions by developing a more self-sufficient economy, which is also able to re-insert 
itself into the wider economy (Moulart et.al ,2000. Jessop, 1998). 
Inclusive economic and social development implemented through educational citizenship and a new 
social economy requires the empowerment of actors (the social integration level) and institutional 
reforms (the system integration level). 
This presupposes a new social economy strategy, where the economic is (re)embedded in the social, 
and the effective coordination of institutional arrangements creating structured coherence at the 
micro-,meso-, macro- and metalevels to ensure the dynamic complementarity of the social economy 
with the wider economic system(Jessop, 1998). 
The challenges of 
(i) linking social and economic rationality's and 
(ii) offering different types of actors positive incentives and the 
(iii) developing efficient governance ensuring "structured coherence" will be briefly illustrated in 
the following section, where the case is the Danish experiences from the beginning of the 
nineties with new educational and life time policy instruments. 
VII. Life Time Policy Instruments - an example of positive sum solutions? 
The Danish case suggests that Life Time Policy Instruments ( Andersen & Larsen, 1995 and 
Schmidt, 1998) can link social and economic rationality in a specific way. They can address both 
the problem of relative overemployment for the full -time working and middle classes and the 
problem of underemployment and labour market exclusion. 
Since 1992 new schemes aiming at sharing work in new ways during the life cycle were implemented 
in Denmark. In 1994 approximately 140,000 (4 per cent of the total labour force) Danes used them 
for temporary leave from the labour market. In general 50-60% of the jobs temporary left by 
participants in the leave schemes were replaced by unemployed persons. 
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The principle of the schemes is to offer the employed section of the work force economic compensation 
from the state (at a level between 60 - 100% of the level of maximum unemployment benefits in Denmark) 
for three types of temporary leave from the labour market: 
(i) parental leave for parents with children up to 9 years old in up to 12 months per child. The social 
(family policy) rationale of the scheme for parental leave is to offer parents suffering from lack of time 
resources a break in their working life career while the children are small( in Denmark the activity rates 
of women is at the same level as men) . The parental leave schemes were also supported by the small 
center parties, who saw the them as a way of addressing the problem oflack of time for parental care 
in dual career families (Carlsen and Larsen , 1993). 
(ii) sabbatical leave. This most "radical" part of the initial reform allowing "unconditional leave" from the 
labour market (up till 12 months) was the most controversial part of the reform package from the start 
(1992) and was never fully implemented. Unlike the two other schemes (which still are in operation 
although the compensation rate has been reduced for the parental leave scheme), the sabbatical 
scheme was critizised (and finally almost disappeared) for being too generous. It allowed individuals 
to receive benefits without giving anything in return to society expect the lUXUry of individual pleasure. 
(iii) educational leave (in a period up to two years) for participation in education. The social and 
economic rationale of the educational leave scheme was to give additional space to the unemployedon 
the ordinary labour market and to secure the maintenance of adequate skills in the workforce. 
Despite institutional obstacles for efficient implementation and political turbulence within the left-center 
political coalition these reforms have survived albeit in a less generous form. The linkage of the "Time 
Poverty issue" (6), the need for the continuous updating of qualifications for (sections of) the work force 
and the need for an more open, inclusive labour market offered a new possibility for cross class and gender 
alliances. 
As Schmidt(l998) argues the innovative and attractive aspects of the leave models are the attempt to fuse 
the otherwise contradictory rationalities of the economic and social. Instead of counterposing economic 
efficiency and social life quality, work sharing and leave reforms try to make them reinforce each other by 
a combination which gives job opportunities to some people, improves life qualities for others, and reduces 
the overall unemployment figures . The social and systemic rationality was the linkage of the problem of 
"relative overwork" -lack of time for updating qualifications, care responsibilities , democratic and 
associational participation - and the problem of "relative underemployment" . 
The Danish experiences have shown that such policies challenge mainstream economists way of analysing 
welfare reforms, not to speak of the public choice school. The leave scheme reform challenged rigid 
ideologies of meritocratism - the direct link between achievement/productivity and reward. It is not 
surprising that the reform mobilized some criticism. But unlike the strategy for an unconditional Basic Income 
(7) the reforms were less open to criticism for not taking the problem of social reciprocity between different 
actors (employed and unemployed) into account. 
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In terms of governance the ongoing implementation has shown that this type of policy requires smooth 
institutional cooperation and involvement of actors with different rationalities (e.g. trade unions, sections of 
employers, educational agencies and labour offices). The ability to ensure "structured coherence" and 
practical governance was not always easy. 
Generally speaking the employers in Denmark have not supported the paid leave models. But a large 
minority was fairly positive once the reforms were implemented. The most progressive employers have 
argued that the reforms could be seen a instruments for "active" labor market policies responding to the 
demand for more flexible working life careers in the postindustrial labor market. (Andersen, I 996).As the 
supporters of the reforms have argued the reforms should be interpreted as rational "risk sharing" between 
the state, employers and employees - instead of being interpreted as enforced costs. 
The Danish experience with the implementation of the leave reforms and the discourse over the reforms has 
demonstrated the intrinsic challenge oflinking efficacy and equity/equality. The challenge for the actors 
at the local, regional and national level has been to demonstrate aconsiderable ability to cooperate leading 
to institutional integration. 
In particular, the challenge of ensuring efficient mechanisms of replacing the leave-takers has been widely 
discussed in Denmark (Schmidt 1998). 
On the one hand, the leave reforms have demonstrated strong public support in public opinions polls. On 
the other, the reforms mobilised strong criticism from rightwing and some center politicians. Influential 
economists campaigned against the reforms, arguing that they did not address the "core issues" of 
strengthening the "work incentives" and abolish the emerging "dependency culture". 
The leave-arrangements are one of the most interesting as well as controversial renewals of the welfare state 
regulation of the relationship between waged and non-waged work during the life-cycle in Denmark. The 
reforms can be interpreted as expressions of the start of a transformation of the "industrial society 
paradigm", of the linear unbroken life career as the social norm, towards a new regulation oflabour-supply. 
This includes the right to "legitimate non-work" for a limited period of time (Andersen and Larsen, 1995)-
a conditional citizens' wage. 
The new life time policyparadigm acknowledges that uncontrolled individualized "careerism" in the new 
"flexible"capitalism can cause social disintegration due to lack of time resources ( in popular terms: 
workaholism) and a gradual breakdown of indivuduals and households capability for maintaining stable 
social and care relations - not to speak about and social and political participation in society outside the 
world of markets and working life (8) 
As danish feminists rightly have emphasized (Borchorst and Christensen, 199X) there are dilemmeas - not 
least form at gender perspective - in the implementaion of the new life time policy. If it is implemented in 
acontext of welfareretrenchment and less emphasis on gender equality issues and policy the danger is that 
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the new life time policy becomes counterproductive with regard to gender equality by increasing - instead 
of reducing - the female share of parental care responsibility. The other danger could be increased risk for 
more or less permanent labour exclusion for lowskilled women using the schemes. This type of critisism 
does not imply that new life time policy should all together be avoided but points out that the dynamics of 
developing new collective answer to the "time poverty problem" depends on the overall macro direction 
of the welfare and gencierregime. 
The positive challenges is to develop life time policy in a way which at the same time stimulates gender 
equality in the family and in working life and mediates the perserve effects of flexible capitalism, which tends 
to create a zero sum game between working life and the rest of the life. 
Using Habennasian concepts one could say that Life Time Policy enables individuals time resources to hold 
and handle the tensions between the forms of rationality oflife world and those of the system-world. In 
certain phases of the working life and family cycle a legitimate space is created for individual risk-handling 
(Beck,1992) or for reflexive life-politics (Giddens 1994), and resources of time to mediate the 
contradictions between integration in the labour market and social integration at the family or 
local/community level. 
The social integration potential of Life Time Politics can thus be interpreted as a reallocation oftime 
resources in order to respond to the increasing tension between the post-modern individual's insistence 
on self-realization by a career on the labour market and time for "identity management and life 
planning"(Hoeming et.al, 1995: 166). When this rationality is combined with human capital investment and 
an inclusive employment rationality (additional jo\).{)penings for unemployed on the ordinary labour market), 
it has the capacity for system integration rationality as well. 
In "The coming of Post-industrial society" Bell (1973) argued that the post-industrial society brought with 
it new types of scarcity and conflicts of distribution, of valued goods which neither socialists nor liberals 
had foreseen - namely simply scarcity oftime. The postindustrial human would become "an economic 
man" disposing the spare time.The Danish experience shows that an innovative welfare state can create new 
institutional solutions to this new dilemma. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The deregulation oflabour markets and the implementation of more restrictive regimes in social assistance 
benefits and the New Rights strategy of moral "demonization" of the produced underclass(where black 
mothers in the USA are the extreme case) tried to create aclimate in which the notion of social citizenship 
could be pushed off the political agenda. 
This path of development reinforces the politics of confrontation and mutual mistrust between increasingly 
separated social fonnations. These negative slipovers from group interactions "constitute the reverse side 
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ofTocqueviliian social capital as the basis of democracy, which includes the interest of the communi ty in 
the interest of the group" (Jordan 1996:39). 
The key question about the "regime politics of postindustrial solidarity" versus "postindusTrial 
meritocratism" is what positive incentives and offensive strategies -e. g. social economy strategies, Life 
Time Politics and Educational citizenship could be in line with emotional, normative and functional needs in 
the age of reflexive modernisation (refer to the quotation of Beck at the beginning). 
As Jordan and others have stressed it is extremely important to make visible the hidden social costs by the 
politics of narrow interested, ego or "club" rational collective action. As Tumin in 1953 emphasized the 
"dysfunction's of social stratification" to day we have to emphasize the "dysfunction's of exclusion" and 10 
discuss "the positive functions of inclusion". 
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Notes 
An interesting example of an institutional fonnation, which is committed to such objectives and 
includes differe~t actors like local activists, professional bodies, politicians at local, national and 
supranational (EU)level is the European Antipoverty Network (EAPN), which is meant to be an anti 
poverty lobby - "a third voice"- operating at local, national and European level. 
2 This is the ambition in Bill Jordan's book "A theory of poverty and social exclusion". 1996. 
3 An example of this was the actions oflong-tenn employed in France in 1997-98, where sections 
of the trade unions supported actions for jobs and better benefits for long tenn unemployed. The 
socialist government partly accepted these demand. 
4 E.g. authoritarian regimes like the apartheid regime in fonner South Africa, where transfonnation 
of core institutions at the level of system integration was necessary. 
5 Bob Jessop conceptualises the changes for the last decades as the shift from the "Keynesian Welfare 
State" to the "Schumpeterian Workfare Regime" (Jessop 1994). 
6 The "Time Poverty" problem and individual ways of coping with it in UK Middle Class households 
e.g. by increased use of service work in the horne is discussed by Gregson and Lowe, 1995. An 
American contribution is Hochscild (1997). A German contribution is Hoerning et.al, 1995. 
7 See also Lind and Moeller (1996) who discusses the Basic Income Strategy with reference to the 
Danish leave schemes. 
8 In a wider sense this problem is at the very centre in Richard Sennetts sharp time diagnosis in his 
book: The Corrosion of character-the personal consequences of work in the new capitalism 
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